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INTRODUCTION 
The world is increasingly being divided into regions. The regional trading blocs are 
becoming more and more deepened and widened around the globe. The European Union (EU) has 
already reached a stage approximating to the trading relations usually found within a country 
rather than between the countries.  The existence of regional economic groups, particularly in 
European and American continents, pose a range of theoretical, empirical and organisational 
questions for developing countries like Pakistan who depend on the countries of these regions for 
a significantly high share of their international trade.  This paper focuses on the prospects of 
extended economic cooperation of Pakistan with the member countries of the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).1 The argument is structured around three parts. 
Part I reviews the theoretical rationale of regional economic cooperation and the recent 
developments shaping the trading relations within the cooperating blocs. Part II critically evaluates 
the relative size and significance of the external sector of the SAARC region countries, along with 
presenting statistical estimates of the major external determinants of the region’s economic 
growth.  Finally, Part III estimates the relationship of major directions of Pakistan’s exports with 
the economic growth of the country and presents the growth projections by increasing and 
diverting the exports to the SAARC and ASEAN region countries.  
 
I. 
A region combines internal liberalisation and external defining or strengthening of a unit 
within the multilateral system, and is therefore very different from either single-country or 
multilateral liberalisation [Page (2000)]. The benefits of multilateral trade under a regulatory 
system, which ensure that liberalisation is implemented and maintained, are well supported in 
economic theory. During the Uruguay Round, however, the question was raised of whether 
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rationalisation was or should be an alternative to global free trade and the concern continues to 
develop ever after the Round’s successful conclusion.2 
The basic analysis of the effects of regional cooperation on the member countries and the 
rest of the world dates from Viner (1950). By liberalising trade among themselves, countries are 
able to substitute for home production by importing goods produced at lower cost in other 
members. This increases both production and consumption and creates trade. Income is increased 
by the availability of the lower cost goods, and production is shifted from the less to the more 
efficient location.  If, however, one country imported previously from a non-member country, but 
the removal of tariffs on imports from fellow members means that imports from them are now 
cheaper to the purchaser, then trade will be diverted from the more efficient outside supplier to the 
less efficient one within the group. The country looses: although there is a consumption gain from 
the cheaper imports, it does not receive the tariff revenue, while the production is shifted from a 
more efficient to a less efficient location. The trade-creating or diverting effects may appear 
instead as investment-creating or diverting, if investment moves to take account of new market 
and cost structures. However, a variety of non-economic motives are also behind the regional 
integration agreements.3  Indeed, the argument that trading binds countries together and therefore 
increases security dates at least from Adam Smith’s view that commerce promoted peace. 
Therefore, if along with improving welfare through trade, the objectives of the region also include 
other development or strategic purposes, and if other countries/regions also have non-trade 
objectives, then diversion and creation must be extended to non-economic results.4  Finally, for 
countries to join together to form a region, it is normally assumed that all must gain relative to not 
joining. 
Although the traditional analysis of trade creation and diversion is based on a view of the 
world in which inter-country trade is driven entirely by differences in productivity and in factor 
endowments, trade can also arise from product differentiation and economies of scale, which 
reduce costs as production grows. Then import barriers become even more costly because 
competition between firms is weakened and consumers lose from the resulting decreases in output 
and increases in price. International trade offers an important means of increasing competition by 
allowing new suppliers to enter markets. The regional blocs, by fostering trade between members, 
can generate such benefits because of the combination of larger firm size (which increases 
economies of scale) and a larger number of firms (which increases competition). When several 
national markets are merged, the number of producers in each country may fall, while the number 
 
2It may also be argued that the initial failures and subsequent difficulties which lengthened the  Uruguay Round  of 
trade talks itself  encouraged regions as alternative approaches to lowering trade barriers. Furthermore, the countries in  the 
effectively operational  regional groups  are  better able to secure their objectives  at  WTO  forums.  
3These are witnessed by the agreements where gain from trade seem very small, or where some countries actually 
receive payments to compensate for trade losses. If trade were the sole motive, the only reason for compensating payments 
to be made  would be if some countries actually lost, or gained   much less,  but needed to be included to provide gains to 
others. Formal compensation payments are included in very few regional agreements, but they are rarely based on trade 
[see, Page (2000)]. 
4Measuring the quantifiable  trade and investment effects  nevertheless remains a useful check on the economic 
costs of other objectives to members and gives part of the effects of regions on third parties.  
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of sellers with reasonable access to each market rises because producers from partner countries 
now have access. These so-called pro-competitive effects appear to have operated strongly during 
the last quarter of the 20th century, resulting in an unprecedented   move toward regionalism. 
These developments have occurred against the backdrop of globalisation: new technologies and 
more liberal trading regimes have led to higher trade volumes, larger investment flows, and 
increasingly footloose production. Presently, almost all countries are members of a bloc, and many 
belong to more than one. More recently, there has been a surge of Regional Trade Agreements 
(RTAs): about 162 RTAs are in force as of 2002 with over half of those coming into existence 
after 1995. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) estimates that over 300 will be in effect by 
2007.5 At their simplest, these agreements merely   remove tariffs on intra-bloc trade in goods, but 
many go beyond that to cover non-tariff barriers and to extend liberalisation to investment and 
other policies. At their deepest, the regional blocs have the goal of economic union and involve the 
construction of shared executive, judicial, and legislative institutions. Such “deep integration” was 
first actively pursued in the Single Market Programme of EU, but its elements are now finding 
their way into the debate on other regional agreements.6 
Finally, there are no rules for policy toward regionalism that are both universal and 
operational—the universal rules are so broad as to be non-operational, and the operational rules 
are too specific to be universal.   Regionalism still remains a very fertile area for research. 
Although the existing literature is huge, there is no consistency in the methodologies and 
intellectual bases of the research or in its conclusions. Indeed, the world of multiple trading blocs 
is still too new to permit a definitive empirical answer. The authors’ approach in the following   is   
also a very limited one. The major concern is the importance of the external sector in the economic 
growth of the SAARC region countries and the significance of intra-region trade in the economic 
growth of Pakistan.   
 
II. 
The SAARC region, home to nearly a fifth of humanity, is endowed with vast natural and 
human resources. It has the potential of becoming a vibrant region in the world, given its enormous 
resources in manpower, technology, agricultural and mineral assets, its history and civilisation, arts 
and culture.7  The authors believe that extended economic and cultural intra-regional exchanges 
 
5See, “Proliferation of regional trade agreements—Implications for multilateral regime”, WTO Website: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regfac_e.htm. 
6For example, in the Americas the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement of 1988 was extended to Mexico 
in 1994 through North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA); Common Market of the South (Mercado Común del Sur–
MERCOSUR) was formed in 1991 and the Group of Three (G3) in 1995; and the Andean Pact and the Central American 
Common Market (CACM) were resurrected in 1991 and 1993, respectively. In 1992 the countries of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), after 25 years of political cooperation with limited trade cooperation, formed a 
meaningful FTA, the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). Since then, additional countries have joined AFTA, which has 
also started talks with China. 
7The SAARC region’s promise is supported by a historical finding  which shows that in AD 1000, Asia, except 
Japan, accounted for more than two thirds of the world GDP based on the strength of the Chinese and Indian civilisations 
[see, Madison (2000)].  
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within the framework of SAARC can realise much of this potential. But, unfortunately, not only that 
the member countries  have so far failed  to make a concrete  move toward that end, the region’s 
share in international trade as a whole is also not commensurate with its headcount  size in the world 
market. Furthermore, the relative share of the intra-region trade of the SAARC countries remains 
regrettably low in their total international merchandise exchange.  The figures listed in Table 1 
provide a vivid picture of the region’s relative share in international trade, from 1990 to 2002, and 
the relative size of its foreign direct investment flows (FDI), from 1991 to 2002. Table 1 also lists the 
share of intra-region trade in SAARC countries’ total exports and imports. The figures show that the 
region as a whole could only manage below one percent share in world exports in eleven years to 
2000, except for the marginal increase over one percent listed for the last two years of the period. 
The region’s share in world imports also shows a consistent trend of a little over one percent 
throughout the period reported in Table 1. The relative size of region’s exports and imports share in 
world trade provides the estimate of its share in the world trade gap which shows a persistent deficit 
ranging between 18–33 percent, with most of the figures falling in the upper range. 
The SAARC region is a global partner in merchandise transactions as well as in the flows of 
foreign investment, and the global trends and prospects affect its member countries also through 
growing integration of capital markets.8  The figures listed in Table 1 show that the relative size of FDI 
flows to the SARRC region is much smaller compared to Asia and developing countries where these 
flows contributed 10 to 15 of total gross fixed investment. Moreover, the quality of FDI inflows is more 
important than their magnitude because all kind of FDI flows do not benefit the host country in a 
similar manner [Kumar (2002)]. Export orientation of the FDI inflows could be in particular an 
indicator of the quality, especially for developing parts of the world. In the SAARC region, FDI plays a 
marginal role in the countries’ export sector [RIS (2004)]. 
 
8See, RIS (2001-02) for evidence on growing synchronisation  of the region’s stock markets with the global  
financial centres.   
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Table 1 
International Trade and Investment Flows: SAARC (1990-2002) 
Year 
     Category 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
1. International Trade   
    (% of the Value of World Trade) 
             
     1a.   Share in  Exports 0.79 0.78 0.82 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.95 0.99 1.03 1.08
     1b.   Share in  Imports 1.12 1.03 1.09 1.09 1.08 1.15 1.19 1.18 1.21 1.21 1.26 1.22 1.28
     1c.   Share in  Trade Gap (Deficit) 0. 33 0.25 0.27 0.20 0.18 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.19 0.20
2. Share of Intra-region Trade   
     (% Share in 1a. and 1b.) 
             
     2a.   Intra-region Exports 3.13 3.59 3.88 3.54 3.71 4.38 4.30 4.10 4.80 4.10 4.20 4.50 4.30
     2b.   Intra-region Imports 1.91 2.48 2.99 3.07 3.25 3.82 4.40 3.70 4.60 3.60 3.40 4.00 3.90
 
Year  
1991-1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
3. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)   
     (% of Gross Fixed Capital Formation) 
       
    3a. World 4.4 7.5 10.9 16.5 20.8 12.8 12.2 
    3b. Developing Countries C 11.4 12 14.3 14.6 12.7 10.5 
    3c. Asia 6.1 9.7 10.2 10.7 13.1 9.8 7.2 
    3d. SAARC* 2.1 4.4 2.7 2.6 2.3 2.3 3.7 
Source:  (Category 1 & 2)  IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics  Yearbook; (category 3), RIS (2004), Table 5.2, p. 40. 
            *Average FDI flows in  SARRC region countries, excluding Maldives.  
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At the outset, the trade share figures listed in Table 1 appear to suggest that the SAARC 
region may not be excessively dependent on international trade. Unfortunately, such a suggestion 
is contradicted by the figures listed in Table 2, which show that the share of trade in the GDP of 
the seven member countries ranged between 14-169 percent at different times in 17 years to 2001. 
India’s share is relatively the lowest throughout the period, but still ranges between 14–30 percent 
of GDP. The smaller countries, particularly Bhutan and Maldives, are the most vulnerable since 
they appear to have unsustainably higher share of trade in the GDP.9   
Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, the SAARC region’s exports are widely 
perceived to lack dynamism in terms of their skill and technological content [Mayer and Wood 
(2000); Lall (2000)].  The low skill and technology intensive goods are not only low value adding 
compared to knowledge intensive goods but are also slow moving because of increasing price 
competition [Lall (1999); Sinha (2001)]. The figures listed in Table 2 also provide the evidence 
that, though excessively dependent on the external sector, the SAARC region countries have not 
performed very well even in terms of their global market share in basic manufactures. Except 
India, who ranks 34, other countries’ rank falls in the range of 83–121. However, almost all 
countries, except Bhutan, perform relatively better in terms of market diversification, while 
product diversification rank is generally quite low.  Indeed, product diversification and differences 
in product quality are very often associated with differences in workers’ skill. In this context, the 
model developed by Kremer (1993) has very important implications for both economic 
development and labour markets. 10 
Finally, given the generally very high share of trade in their GDP, the member countries of 
SAARC are already excessively vulnerable to external shocks. The situation warrants that the 
region’s countries pay greater attention to increasing the size of their economies, rather than 
simply emphasising the sheer increase in exports.  A reasonably high and sustainable rate of 
growth of the member countries will not only provide the resilience for absorbing the external 
shocks, it will also help increase their share in international trade and investment flows.  This 
argument is carried into the Part III of the study, through some findings made in this part on the 
major external sources of growth in the SAARC region countries. These findings are discussed 
below. 
 
9The substantial  fall in the share of Maldives’ exports, as a result of graduation of  the country  from Least 
Developed Countries (LDC) status,   to the preferential EU  market,  from 21 percent in 1997 to 12 percent in 2001, is a 
case in point. The Maldives would lose the entire margin on fish exports following graduation [see, WTO (2003)]. 
10 In this model, Kremer applies O-ring metaphor to his development theory  which explains the differences in 
income between developed and developing countries.  An O-ring is a donut shaped rubber seal. The implications of this 
theory are very important since they seem to contradict a great deal of conventional wisdom, especially the assertions of 
the theory of comparative advantage [see, Kremer (1993)].  
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Table 2 
Proportion of Trade in GDP and Trade Performance Index: SAARC Countries 
Country 
    Category Bangladesh Bhutan India Maldives Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka 
1. Proportion of Trade (% of GDP)        
    1985-87 24.26 61.52 14.08 60.26 31.91 34.01 61.87 
    1990-92 19.83 75.05 18.78 88.51* 36.28 37.45 68.42 
    1996-98 30.47 76.15 25.45 167.08 59.59 36.40 79.17 
    2000-01 35.50 89.47* 29.79 168.94 55.06 35.84 85.42 
2. Trade Performance Index (Basic Manufactures)        
Relative Ranking among 184 Countries 122 124 129 – – 124 129 
Trend of Exports 18 123 53 – 70 26 105 
Average Annual Change in Per Capita Exports 105 121 80 – 25 54 99 
Share in World Market 83 119 34 – 121 95 93 
Product Diversification 81 123 24 – 90 81 94 
Product Spread (Concentration) 71 124 19 – 103 86 81 
Market Diversification 53 122 32 – 44 62 71 
Market Spread (Concentration 62 122 14 – 88 45 74 
Source: RIS (2004),  (category 1),  Table 2.1, p.19; (category 2) Table 4.6, p. 33. In (category 2), data year for 
Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka is 1997-2001, while the data year for Bhutan, Nepal and Pakistan 1995-1999. 
           *Refers to the year 2000 and year 1990 figure for Bhutan and Maldives respectively. 
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Table 3 lists the coefficients of relationships estimated within a system of two simultaneous 
equations,11 utilising the pooled data for the period from 1972-2001. The initial formulation of the 
system included a much larger number of instruments, many of which had to be dropped due to 
the inaccessibility of sufficient data for the countries included in the model. The estimated model 
takes the following specific form in its analytical formulation:  
EGit=  β0+β1DIit+β2 XEit+β3PLit+ β4ERit+β5TBit+uit  … … (1) 
DIit=β0+β1EGit+β2XEit+β3PLit+β4ERit+β5TBit+β6DCit+uit  … (2) 
Where, 
 EG = Economic growth (growth rate of GDP). 
 DI = Domestic investment (growth rate of gross capital formation). 
 XE = Export earnings (growth rate). 
 PL = Price level  (growth rate of Consumer Price Index [CPI]). 
 ER = Exchange rate (growth rate of domestic currency’s price   in terms of US$). 
 TB = Trade balance (ratio to the GDP). 
 DC = Domestic credit (growth rate). 
 U = Stochastic error term. 
The values for all variables have been taken from International Financial Statistics (IFS), 
published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). All values have been transformed into 
constant terms for calculating the real growth rate of the variables. Two Stage Least Square 
(2SLS) technique is applied on E-view package for statistical estimation of the model.  
The results reported in Table 3 show that two of the three external sector variables, XEit  
and TBit, turn  out to be significant in Equation 1, indicating that external sector is having 
important influences on growth in the  SAARC region countries. The coefficient of export 
earnings, XEit, is significant at 10 percent level and shows that one percent increase in export 
earnings increases the growth rate of GDP by .04 percent, meaning that a doubling of the current 
export earnings in the countries of the region will increase, on average, the GDP growth rate of the 
countries by 4 percent. Given the large share of international trade in the SAARC countries’ GDP, 
this result is quite expected. The other significant external sector variable is trade balance, TBit, 
and it carries a large coefficient which is significant at 5 percent level. It shows that one percent 
decrease in trade imbalance increases the GDP by 4.85 percent. All countries in the SAARC 
region have been experiencing persistent trade balance deficits and the result provides sufficient 
g r o u n d  t o  w o r k  o n  
Table 3 
External Determinants of Growth: SAARC (1972–2001) Estimated Coefficients                                    
Equation 1 Equation 2 
Dependent variable= EGit Observations= 112 Dependent variable=DIit Observations= 112
Variable Coefficient t-Statistics Variable Coefficient t-Statistics 
 
11The authors could not access the data for Bhutan and Maldives on the variables included in the model.  
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Constant 3.166*** 2.805 Constant –5.553 –1.517 
DIit 0.368*** 4.308 EGit 1.959*** 4.377 
XEit 0.042* 1.699 PLit 0.080 0.415 
PLit –0.026 –0.336 ERit –0.103 –0.731 
ERit –0.008 –0.124 TBit 9.669* 1.779 
TBit –4.848** –2.231 DCit 0.153 1.356 
AR(I) –0.394*** –3.884 AR(I) –0.387*** –4.349 
R2= 0.286  Adjusted R2= 0.245 R2= 0.363  Adjusted R2= 0.326 
D.W.= 1.964  D.H.= 0.496 D.W.= 1.968  D.H.= 0.496 
***Significant at 1 percent level.  **Significant at 5 percent level.   *Significant at 10 percent level.    
 
reducing the gap between export receipts and import payments. The coefficient of the third 
external sector variable, exchange rate, ERit, carries a negative sign, implying that appreciation of 
the domestic currency is not conducive for the economic growth of the SAARC region countries. 
However, this result is not valid because the estimated coefficient is insignificant. Of the two 
internal sector variables, domestic investment and price level, the former, DIit, turns out to be 
significant at one percent. It is a theoretically valid result. The negative sign of the estimated 
coefficient of price level, PLit, implies that inflation hurts the growth of GDP, but the result is not 
significant, hence again invalid. Finally, the size of the adjusted R square for estimated Equation 1 
is only 0.25, showing that 25 percent of the variation in the GDP growth rate of SAARC region 
countries is explained by the explanatory variables included in the model. Although this appears to 
be a weak fit, it is usually accepted within a system. 
The results reported for estimated Equation 2 again endorse the theoretically valid positive 
relationship between economic growth and investment.  The coefficient of the growth variable, 
EGit, is significant at one percent level, showing that one percent increase in growth rate increases 
domestic investment by about 2 percent. A positive and significant relationship is also observed 
between the domestic investment and the deficit in the balance of payments. The coefficient of the 
trade balance variable, TBit, is significant at 5 percent level and shows that one percent increase in 
balance of trade deficit increases the domestic investment by about 10 percent. Apparently, this 
result is not compatible with the findings in Equation 1 which show that deficit in trade balance 
decreases growth, while the latter is positively and significantly related with domestic investment.  
However, the overall inference is theoretically valid, particularly in the context of the dependency 
created by the persistent deficit in the trade balance which may negatively affect the investment 
efficiency.  The other variables, PLit, ERit and DCit, included in Equation 2 turn out to be 
insignificant.  
The size of the adjusted R square for estimated Equation 2 is greater than the growth 
equation, showing that 33 percent of the variation in the growth rate of the domestic investment of 
SAARC region countries is explained by the right hand side variables in the analytical 
formulation. Finally, the estimated model was checked for misspecifications, autocorrelation was 
detected and removed by applying autoregressive scheme one to the both equations in the system.  
 
III. 
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Pakistan after India is the second largest country in the SAARC region and it is constantly 
making progress in unilaterally liberalising her trade regime. The external sector reform measures 
of the 1990s are also continuing in the new millennium [see, RIS (2002)]. However, it is important 
to note that majority of the liberalisation measures of Pakistan are part of the IMF/World Bank 
Policy framework paper of December 1998.12 The country, for example, is currently required to 
implement key sector reforms as part of the conditionality of Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility (PRGF).13 Indeed, since 1988, Pakistan has been required to correct her macroeconomic 
imbalances under the terms imposed by the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) of the 
international funding agencies. Findings made by a number of studies suggest that SAPs were 
accompanied with rising income inequality and poverty in the country [see, Kemal (1994); Jaffery  
and Khattak (1995) and Anwar (1996)].   
The analysis presented below is based on the premise that Pakistan needs to adopt 
alternative growth strategies which ought to help improve the welfare of the masses. Any such 
strategy requires both higher growth rate, which is sustainable in the long-run, and the freedom to 
manoeuvre the public policy toward optimal targets. The authors believe that for Pakistan, 
extended economic cooperation with the SAARC region is the most viable strategy compared to 
many other alternatives. In this case, the region might even tend to be trade creating, through 
increased production competition between the members, not diverting, because the countries will 
not be significantly changing the import direction, at least in the early stages of integration. 
However, an   analysis of the trade effects would require data on: 
 • each country’s imports and exports from the region and from the rest of the world;  
 • the composition and direction of each country’s unrecorded border trade; 14 
 • actual cost estimates  for present and potential production  of  different  product 
categories in  each  country; and  
 •  Information on each country’s demand and supply elasticities of major tradable.    
 
Unfortunately, except for the direction of trade, hardly any effort has been made so far to 
generate the data for the SARRC region on the variables listed above. Therefore, it is not possible 
to formulate the trade and production models providing the estimates of even immediate static 
effects.  The authors have made a limited effort in the following by estimating and projecting the 
growth impact of the major destinations of Pakistan’s exports. The analysis is carried out with the 
help of three single equation growth models which take following specific forms in analytical 
formulation:   
GPt= β0+β1SXt+β2AXt+β3OXt+β4DXt+β5RXt+β6FRt+β7FLt+ 
 
12See, http:/www.ustr.gov/reports/nte/2003/Pakistan.pdf. 
13In December 2001, IMF approved a three year agreement  of about $1.32 million for  Pakistan, under the PRGF 
[see, RIS (2004)]. 
14For example, Due to the lack of formalised trade structure between India and Pakistan, unofficial trade between 
these countries is estimated between 8 billion to 16 billion rupees a year, many time more than the regular and official trade 
[see, Wadhva (1997)].   
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           +β8RIt+β9 MSt+β10 Dt+ut  … … … … (3) 
GPt=β0+β1SXt+β2EXt+β3FRt+β4FLt+β5RIt+β6MSt+β7Dt+ut … (4) 
GPt= β0+β1XSt+β2DXt+β3XRt+β4FRt+β5FLt+β6RIt+ β7MSt+ 
        + β8 Dt+ut  … … … … … … (5) 
Where,  
 GP = Growth of Pakistan’s economy (growth rate of GDP). 
 SX = Growth rate of exports to the SAARC region countries. 
 AX = Growth rate of exports to the ASEAN region countries. 
 OX = Growth rate of the exports to the countries of the Organisation of Islamic Conference  
[OIC]. 
 DX = Growth rate of exports to the developed countries of the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development  [OECD]. 
 RX = Growth rate of the exports to the rest of the world.  
 FR = Growth rate of the net foreign workers’ remittances.  
 FL = Growth rate of the net disbursement of foreign loans.  
 RI = Growth rate of real interest rate.  
 Ms = Growth rate of money supply.  
 D = Dummy variable for type of government (military= 1). 
 EX = Growth rate of exports to the entire world excluding SAARC region.  
 XS = Growth rate of exports to the South (includes only the countries of the SAARC and 
ASEAN regions). 
 XR = Growth rate of the exports to the rest of the world (generated by adding exports to the 
OIC countries in the RX of Equation 3). 
The source of all data, except real interest rate, is Economic Survey of Pakistan. The data on 
real interest rate has been taken from the Annual Report of State Bank, published by the State 
Bank of Pakistan. The growth rates have been calculated by converting all values into constant 
market prices with 1980-81 as the base year.  All three models are estimated by applying Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) technique on the E-view package. The results are reported in Table 4.  
 
Table 4 
External Determinants of Growth: Pakistan (1977–2002)Estimated Coefficients 
                          Dependent Variable= GP Observations= 26 
Equation 3                          Equation 4                          Equation 5 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistics Variable Coefficient t-Statistics Variable Coefficient t-Statistics 
Constant  1.423  1.249 Constant  2.918***  2.737 Constant  2.223**  2.390 
SXt  0.017*  1.875 SXt  0.030***  2.810 XSt  0.047***  4.473 
AXt  0.019**  2.269 EXt –0.005 –0.183 DXt –0.010 –0.667 
OXt –0.012 –0.880 FRt –0.011 –1.376 XRt –0.013 –0.815 
DXt –0.012 –0.724 FLt  0.002  1.520 FRt –0.011* –1.737 
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RXt  0.012  1.040 RIt –0.169** –2.325 FLt  0.001*  1.642 
FRt –0.013* –1.679 MSt  0.101  1.608 RIt –0.154*** –2.549 
FLt  0.001  0.955 Dt  2.410***  4.506 MSt  0.139***  2.519 
RIt –0.096 –1.244 AR(1) –0.429 –1.608 Dt  2.573***  5.688 
MSt  0.171***  2.647 Adjusted R2=0.541               
D.W.= 1.943 
AR(1) –0.462* –1.773 
Dt  2.591***  4.537 Adjusted R2= 0.0.674              
D.W.= 2.012 
Adjusted R2= 0.639             
D.W.= 2.263 
F= 5.615 
D.H.= 0.070                            
F= 4.679 
D.H.= 0.070                              
F= 6.740                                                   
***Significant at 1 percent level. **Significant  at 5 percent level.   *Significant at 10 percent level.  
 
In Equation 3, the direction of Pakistan’s exports has been divided into five broad 
categories including four county groups, SAARC, ASEAN, OIC, OECD, while the fifth category 
takes into account the country’s exports to the rest of the world. Foreign loans and foreign 
workers’ remittances, another two important sources of foreign exchange for the country, have 
also been included in the model.  In order to improve the goodness of the fit, the model 
additionally incorporates three exogenously determined internal sector variables, namely, real 
interest rate, money supply and type of the government.  
The coefficients of five variables turn out to be significant in estimated Equation 3. They 
include three external sector variables, SXt, AXt and FRt, and two internal sector variables, MSt 
and Dt.  Of the former, the exports to SAARC and ASEAN countries, SXt, AXt, are positively 
related with the economic growth of Pakistan and the estimated coefficients are significant at 
ten percent and five percent level respectively. The coefficient of the variable representing the 
trade with SAARC countries, SXt, is 0.017.  Given a very low share of exports to SAARC 
region in Pakistan’s total exports, the apparently small size of the coefficient of SXt happens to 
have huge significance, implying that doubling of Pakistan’s exports to the SAARC region is 
going to increase her growth rate by about 1.8 percent. The estimated coefficients of the 
variables OXt and DXt representing the OIC and OECD countries respectively show that exports 
to these country groups are negatively related with Pakistan’s economic growth.  However 
important in its implications, this result is not valid since the coefficients of OXt and DXt are 
statistically insignificant. The variable representing exports to the rest of the world, RXt is not 
significant either, but its sign is positive. The foreign workers remittances appear to be 
negatively related with the economic growth of Pakistan, because the sign of the estimated 
coefficient of FRt is negative and statistically significant at ten percent level. The estimated 
coefficient of foreign loans, FLt, on the other hand, shows a positive, though statistically 
insignificant, relationship with the economic growth of the country. Finally, two of the three 
internal sector variables, MSt and Dt, turn out to have a positive and highly significant 
relationship with economic growth. The large estimated coefficient of the dummy variable 
shows that growth demonstratively increases during the military regime compared to the period 
when the country is democratically governed. 
The results of the estimated Equation 4 and Equation 5 are also reported in Table 4.  It is 
observed that a consistency exists between the estimated coefficients of Equation 3, Equation 4 
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and Equation 5, since signs of the estimated variables remain unchanged. Some change, however, 
is observed in the significance level of the variables because of the change in formulation of the 
export variables. Autocorrelation was detected in the estimated Equation 4 and Equation 5 and it 
was removed in both cases by applying autoregressive scheme 1. 
Table 5 lists the alternative scenarios of growth projections for Pakistan’s economy 
between 2003-04 and 2020-21. These projections are based on the estimated Equation 4 and 
Equation 5.  The former splits Pakistan’s export destination in two categories, namely, the 
SAARC region (SXt) and the entire world (EXt) excluding the SAARC region countries. The latter 
on the other hand, splits Pakistan’s export destination in three broad categories, namely, the South 
(XSt), represented only by the member countries of the SAARC and ASEAN regions; the 
developed countries (DXt), represented by the member countries of the OECD; and the rest of the 
world (XRt), represented by all remaining trading partners of Pakistan including the member 
countries of the OIC. 
The first three scenarios are generated by alternatively introducing in estimated Equation 4 
an increase in exports to the SAARC region, a diversion of exports to the SAARC region, and part 
increase and part diversion of exports to the SAARC region.  The projected growth estimates are 
quite realistic since increase and diversion of exports when introduced separately are only of the 
proportion of half a percent  during  the  first six years, 2004-2009, one percent during the next six 
years,  
Table  5 
Growth Impact of Increasing and Diverting Exports to SAARC and ASEAN 
                                                     (Pakistan: 2004-2021) 
                                                Growth Projections 
                                 SAARC      SAARC and ASEAN 
Year Increase Diversion Increase + Diversion Diversion 
2004 5.12 5.08 5.07 5.26 
2005 5.14 5.10 5.09 5.29 
2006 5.15 5.11 5.11 5.31 
2007 5.17 5.13 5.12 5.34 
2008 5.18 5.15 5.14 5.37 
2009 5.20 5.17 5.16 5.40 
2010 5.21 5.18 5.17 5.43 
2011 5.24 5.22 5.20 5.48 
2012 5.27 5.25 5.24 5.54 
2013 5.30 5.29 5.27 5.60 
2014 5.33 5.32 5.30 5.66 
2015 5.36 5.36 5.33 5.72 
2016 5.39 5.39 5.37 5.77 
2017 5.41 5.41 5.38 5.80 
2018 5.42 5.42 5.40 5.83 
2019 5.44 5.44 5.41 5.86 
2020 5.45 5.46 5.43 5.89 
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2021 5.47 5.48 5.45 5.92 
 
2010-2015, and half a percent in the remaining five years, 2016-2020. Similarly, while introducing 
increase and diversion together the same proportions are maintained in the same order for the 
increase, while the respective diverted proportions are 0.25 percent, 0.50 percent and 0.25 percent. 
The rationale of simulating with relatively low proportions is that, in the short-run at least, neither 
the economy can manage to increase the exports spectacularly and indefinitely, nor the existing 
structures have the ability to sustain the risk of significantly diverting the exports from the 
traditional markets. 
It is observed in Table 5 that pure increase in exports provides slightly better results than pure 
diversion till the year 2016. Thereafter, the pure diversion fares slightly better than the pure increase. 
Although apparently the difference is negligibly minor, its implications cannot be ignored for a 
strategic approach to extended economic cooperation of Pakistan with the SAARC region. The 
argument is further supported by the projected growth rates of the scenario which introduces part 
increase and part diversion of Pakistan’s exports to the SAARC region.  It is observed that the impact 
of such a policy is not as much favourable as is the impact with pure increase and pure diversion, 
though the relative difference again appears negligible.  Finally, the projected growth rate in 2021 is 
maximally higher than the actual growth rate in 2003 only by half a percent. It appears to be a small 
difference in absolute terms, but its relative significance is indisputable in terms of the optimality of 
the target and the promise which it holds out in other spheres of economic activity for extended 
cooperation of Pakistan and the SAARC region countries.  
Table 5 also lists another scenario providing useful policy guidelines in the short-run. The 
results reported in Table 4 for estimated Equation 3 suggest that the exports to both the ASEAN 
and SAARC countries are positively related with the economic growth of Pakistan. The authors 
have projected the growth rates of Pakistan’s economy based on the estimated Equation 5 which 
uses the combined exports to the SAARC and ASEAN region countries as one of the explanatory 
variables, along with separating the variation in growth caused by the exports to the OECD 
countries.  This scenario introduces pure diversion of exports to the SAARC and ASEAN region 
countries from the OECD countries. The successively proportionate size of diversion over the 
years remains same as before.  It is observed that the growth impact of exports in this scenario is 
about 0.16 percent higher than that of the scenario where the diversion is introduced only to the 
SAARC region countries from the rest of the world.  Such an alternative is reckoned to anchor 
Pakistan’s gradual move toward greater integration within the SAARC region.  
 
CONCLUSION 
There is increasingly widening and deepening international policy integration among the 
developed countries of the world. Regional organisations of developing countries on the other 
hand, have a history of enthusiastic formation followed by dissent, resulting in either dissolution 
or a lapse into purely formal existence.   
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The promise that SAARC holds out is enormous for the countries of the region. The 
initiative itself is now 20 years old. The organisation should be in the full maturity of its youth, 
ready to take on new challenges and directions. But, unfortunately, SAARC carries the image of 
high profile and low performance, lacking concrete objectives, commitment, and even a sense of 
regional identity.  For example, The problems of finding continuing advantages in joint 
development, the reconcilable and irreconcilable differences over the direction and rate of 
development, and the allocation of benefits among the members have not been addressed by any 
of the SAARC forums. Furthermore, and perhaps most importantly, while the world has entered 
the 21st century, the two biggest member countries of SAARC have frequently demonstrated their  
will  to  revisit  and rewrite the history of  the past  millennium.15    
It is high time that SAARC departs from its endless round of meetings, seminars, and 
conferences, and moves to collaborative projects that bring tangible results in terms of growth and 
development of the member countries. A range of clearly defined optimal objectives may add both 
viability and stability to SAARC. The initial advantages may be less important, but the long-term 
advantages are certainly overriding.  
Finally, the authors suggest that serious efforts should be made to generate the relevant data 
and formulate the trade and production models to make firm calculations at least for the immediate 
static effects of a custom union in the SAARC region.  The ex ante calculation of these effects will 
certainly help move toward the target by providing pragmatic guidelines for determining the 
readjustment period. A workable plan essentially requires that the calculation of the static effects 
encompasses the effects on each member country, including each interest within a country. 
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